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DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO CONFRONT
THE WITNESSES AGAINST HIM-IS
THERE AN EXCEPTION BEHIND THE
SCREEN?: COY V. IOWA
The confrontation clause of the sixth amendment guarantees
that "[iln all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him."' Su-
preme Court decisions interpreting the clause have established
that it provides a criminal defendant with the right of cross-exami-
nation, 2 the right to have the jury observe the demeanor3 of a dam-
' U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The accused's right to confront the witnesses against him is a
fundamental right and applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Pointer v.
Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403-06 (1965). The precise origin of the confrontation clause has con-
founded commentators for centuries. See F. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTI-
TUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 104 (1951). Heller asserts that dissatisfaction with the evi-
dence admitted at the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh provided the impetus for including the
sixth amendment in the Bill of Rights. Id. Raleigh had been tried for high treason on No-
vember 17, 1603. See Graham, The Right of Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Wal-
ter Raleigh Loses Another One, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 99, 99-100 (1972). The confession of an
alleged coconspirator, Lord Cobham, was the only evidence against Raleigh. Id. at 100.
When Lord Cobham's ex parte written statement was used against him, Raleigh demanded
that the accused be required to confront him, stating: "The proof of the Common Law is by
witness and jury; let Cobham be here, let him speak it. Call my accuser before my face, and
I have done." Id. (quoting 2 T. HOWELL, STATE TRIALS 15-16 (1816)). Other commentators,
however, have concluded that there is little reason to believe that the confrontation clause
was designed to prevent reoccurrences of the abuses present at Raleigh's trial. Larkin, The
Right of Confrontation: What Next?, 1 TEx. TECH L. REV. 67, 70 (1969) (reviewing history
of sixth amendment to show insufficient evidence warranting common perception that Ra-
leigh case influenced drafters of confrontation clause). Most authorities agree simply that
the intention of the framers in drafting the clause is uncertain. See, e.g., Baker, The Right
to Confrontation, The Hearsay Rules, and Due Process-A Proposal for Determining
When Hearsay May Be Used in Criminal Trials, 6 CONN. L. REv. 529, 532 (1974) (historical
record fails to expose intent of draftsmen behind confrontation clause); Note, Confronta-
tion, Cross-Examination, and the Right to Prepare a Defense, 56 GEO. L.J. 939, 953 (1968)
(historical evidence fails to adequately explain whether drafters intended confrontation
clause to secure right of confrontation in addition to cross-examination); Note, Preserving
the Right to Confrontation-A New Approach to Hearsay Evidence in Criminal Trials, 113
U. PA. L. REv. 741, 742 (1965) (language of confrontation clause is ambiguous because words
only expressly guarantee defendant right to be present, without opportunity for cross-
examination).
2 See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51 (1987); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S.
673, 678-79 (1986); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973); Dowdell v. United
States, 221 U.S. 325, 330 (1911); see also Griswold, The Due Process Revolution and Con-
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aging witness, 4 and the right to a face-to-face encounter with his
accuser.' The only acceptable limitations on these rights are the
admission into evidence of certain hearsay statements6 and a few
restraints on the scope of cross-examination. Recently, in Coy v.
Iowa,8 the Supreme Court held that the placement of a screen be-
tween a defendant and an allegedly sexually abused child witness
during the child's testimony, which prevented the witness from ob-
serving the defendant, violated the defendant's constitutional right
to a face-to-face confrontation.9
frontation, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 711, 713-26 (1971) (reviewing court decisions demonstrating
Supreme Court's evolving interpretation of relationship between right of confrontation and
cross-examination).
Professor Wigmore claimed the right of confrontation primarily encompassed the right
of cross-examination:
Now confrontation is, in its main aspect, merely another term for cross-examina-
tion. It is the preliminary step to securing the opportunity of cross-examination,
and so far as it is essential, this is only because cross-examination is essential. The
right of confrontation is the right to the opportunity of cross-examination.
5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1366, at 28 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970). Wigmore's reduction of
confrontation rights to that of mere cross-examination has been vigorously criticized. See
Graham, supra note 1, at 104 (Wigmore's interpretation "highly partisan and probably inac-
curate"); Larkin, supra note 1, at 69 n.9 (1969) (authorities relied upon by Wigmore not
supportive of his conclusion).
I See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S.
237, 242-43 (1895).
4 See Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 190 (1987). The Court said that a witness would
be considered "against" a defendant "for purposes of the Confrontation Clause only if his
testimony is part of the body of evidence that the jury may consider in assessing his guilt."
Id.; see also Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206 (1987) (pretrial confession of one co-
defendant not admissible against the other unless confessor takes stand).
See Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 51.
' See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 83-90 (1970); Green, 399 U.S. at 158. In Green, the
Supreme Court held that the "Confrontation Clause is not violated by admitting a declar-
ant's out-of-court statements, as long as the declarant is testifying as a witness and subject
to full and effective cross-examination." Id.
' See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678 (1986). The Van Arsdall Court stated
that a trial judge may impose reasonable limits on defense counsel's inquiry. Id. It is gener-
ally agreed that the trial court has broad discretion over the scope of cross-examination. See
United States v. Bright, 630 F.2d 804, 816-17 (5th Cir. 1980). Nevertheless, certain limita-
tions on a defendant's ability to cross-examine the witnesses against him could violate his
right of confrontation. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 319-20 (1974). "The State's policy
interest in protecting the confidentiality of a juvenile offender's record cannot require yield-
ing of so vital a constitutional right as the effective cross-examination for bias of an adverse
witness." Id. at 320; see also Chavis v. North Carolina, 637 F.2d 213, 225-26 (4th Cir. 1980)
(refusal to allow defendant to cross-examine witness regarding special treatment received
from police violated defendant's sixth amendment rights because defendant unable to at-
tack witness' credibility).
8 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988).
0 Id. at 2802.
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In Coy, the defendant was charged with sexually assaulting
two thirteen-year-old girls. 10 At trial, the prosecution moved to al-
low the child witnesses to testify in accordance with the procedures
set forth in a recently enacted Iowa statute." The statute allowed
children to testify from behind a screen which enabled the defend-
ant to see and hear the children, but prevented the children from
seeing or hearing the defendant. 2 The trial court rejected the de-
fendant's contention that this procedure violated his right under
the confrontation clause to a face-to-face confrontation, 3 and al-
lowed the child witnesses to testify from behind the screen.' 4 The
jury returned a verdict against the defendant. On appeal, the
Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the defendant's conviction, rejecting
his constitutional claim on the ground that his ability to cross-ex-
amine the child witnesses had not been restricted. 6 The Supreme
Court of the United States reversed.' 7
Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia explained that while the
Court has primarily been called upon to consider the confrontation
clause in the context of admissibility of hearsay statements and
limitations upon the scope of cross-examination, 8 these are not
10 Id. at 2799. The incident allegedly occurred while the girls were camping in the back-
yard of a house next door to that of the defendant. See id. The girls said their assailant
entered their tent after they had fallen asleep but that they were unable to identify him
because he wore a stocking over his face. See id.
11 Id. Under the Iowa Code, a child witness may testify via closed circuit television or
from behind a screen. IOWA CODE § 910A.14 (1988). Besides Iowa, twenty states have en-
acted statutes allowing a sexually-abused child to testify without seeing or hearing the de-
fendant. See Coyle, Application of Confrontation Clause: A Difficult Issue in Child Abuse
Cases, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 2, 1987, at 1, col. 2. Only Iowa has adopted the screening device,
however. Id. In People v. Rivera, decided in light of Coy, a New York court held that New
York's "two way" closed circuit television procedure did not violate defendant's constitu-
tional right to confrontation. 535 N.Y.S.2d 909, 912 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1988).
12 IOWA CODE § 910A.14(1) (1988). Section 910A.14 of the Iowa Code also provides that
if the witness testifies in this manner the defendant and his counsel must be able to speak
with each other during the testimony and the child must be told that the defendant can see
him and hear the testimony. Id.
11 See Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2799-2800. The trial court rejected the defendant's claim, but
instructed the jury not to infer guilt from the use of the procedure. See id.
14 See id. at 2799.
11 See id.
10 See id. at 2800. The Iowa Supreme Court also found that the use of the procedure
was not inherently prejudicial and, therefore, did not violate defendant's presumption of
innocence. Id.
1' See id. at 2803. The Court remanded, asking the Iowa Supreme Court to decide if
the trial court's error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See id.
" See id. at 2800.
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the most significant aspects of the clause.' 9 Rather, Justice Scalia
declared that it is the defendant's right to a face-to-face encounter
with an adversary witness that is at the "core" of a defendant's
confrontation rights,20 as that right serves to" 'ensure the integrity
of the fact-finding process.' ,,21 Justice Scalia then determined that
the one-way screening procedure authorized by the Iowa statute
violated the defendant's right of confrontation because it allowed
the adverse witness to testify without facing the defendant.
22
Without deciding whether an exception would be available when
there is a compelling state interest to protect child victims of sex-
ual abuse,28 Justice Scalia found the statute under consideration
19 See id. Justice Scalia suggested there is "at least some room for doubt" as to whether
these elements are included within the confrontation clause. Id.
20 Id. at 2801. Justice Scalia relied on several prior decisions of the Court which demon-
strated the Court's consistent view that the right of confrontation is a fundamental right
contained within the confrontation clause. Id. at 2801-02. For example, in Kirby v. United
States, the Court stated that under the clause, "a fact which can be primarily established
only by witnesses cannot be proved against an accused.., except by witnesses who confront
him at the trial, upon whom he can look while being tried, whom he is entitled to cross-
examine, and whose testimony he may impeach." 174 U.S. 47, 55 (1899). In California v.
Green, the Court noted that the defendant's right to confront the witnesses against him
forms "the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation Clause." 399 U.S. 149, 157
(1970). Moreover, in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, the Court said the defendant's right to physi-
cally confront the witnesses against him was one of two protections afforded defendants by
the confrontation clause. 480 U.S. 39, 51 (1987).
21 Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2802 (quoting Kentucky v. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. 2658, 2662 (1987)).
Justice Scalia asserted that "confrontation is essential to fairness" because a witness is more
likely to tell the truth when testifying face-to-face with the defendant. Id. Although Justice
Scalia recognized that testifying face-to-face with the defendant may be emotionally upset-
ting, he stressed the ultimate fact that the face-to-face confrontation requirement may also
expose a witness who is lying or who has been coached. Id. Thus, Justice Scalia felt the
stress a witness may suffer as a result of testifying in front of the defendant is a reasonable
cost of the protection afforded the defendant. See id.; see also Kentucky v. Stincer, 107 S.
Ct. 2658, 2662 (1987) (confrontation clause reflects attempt to protect accuracy of "truth-
finding functions of a criminal trial"); Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 540 (1986) (right to
confront and cross-examine "is primarily a functional right that promotes reliability in
criminal trials").
22 Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2802. Justice Scalia believed that it would be "difficult to imagine a
more obvious or damaging violation of the defendant's right to a face-to-face encounter." Id.
22 Id. at 2803. Justice Scalia noted that the Court has previously acknowledged excep-
tions to the rights conferred by the confrontation clause. Id. at 2802. However, he distin-
guished these cases from the case at hand:
The rights referred to in those cases... were not the right narrowly and explicitly
set forth in the Clause, but rather rights that are, or were asserted to be, reasona-
bly implicit-namely, the right to cross-examine; the right to exclude out-of-court
statements; and the asserted right to face-to-face confrontation at some point in
the proceedings other than the trial itself.
Id. at 2802-03 (citations omitted). Justice Scalia explained that while the Court has ex-
1988]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:124
unconstitutional in any event because it failed to require individu-
alized findings as to the necessity of protecting the particular child
witness.24
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice White, concurred, agreeing
with the majority that the defendant has a right to a face-to-face
encounter with the witnesses against him,2" but emphasizing that
the right is not absolute.2 She further maintained that upon a
case-specific finding of necessity, an exception might properly be
made to further the state's interest in protecting child witnesses.27
Justice Blackmun, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, dis-
sented, arguing that the defendant's right to a face-to-face encoun-
ter was not at the "core" of the rights afforded by the confronta-
tion clause.2s Thus, he found that as with the other rights
amined other important interests in determining "what implications are reasonable," this
does not mean the Court has authorized an all-encompassing exception to the defendant's
right to confront the witnesses against him. Id. at 2803. Justice Scalia decided to "leave for
another day ... the question whether any exceptions exist." Id.
24 Id. Justice Scalia declared that if an exception were permissible, it would only be
allowed where "necessary to further an important public policy." Id. Moreover, while Iowa
had an interest in protecting child sexual abuse victims, it failed to show that the proce-
dures authorized by the statute were necessary under these circumstances. Id. Thus, Justice
Scalia concluded, "[s]ince there have been no individualized findings that these particular
witnesses needed special protection, the judgment here could not be sustained by any con-
ceivable exception." Id.
25 Id. at 2805 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor also agreed with the major-
ity that the defendant's right to confront the adverse witnesses was violated in this case. Id.
at 2804 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
26 Id. at 2804 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor said the Court has often
stated "that the Clause 'reflects a preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial,' and
[has] expressly recognized that this preference may be overcome in a particular case if close
examination of 'competing interests' so warrants." Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63-64 (1980)). Thus, simply because the right is expressly
stated in the confrontation clause does not mandate a conclusion that the right is absolute.
See id. at 2804-05 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
27 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor recognized the growing problem of
child sexual abuse. See id. at 2803 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Prosecuting child sexual
abuse offenders presents unique problems because of both the difficulty in detecting the
crime when the child is the only witness and, even if it is detected, the fear of further
traumatizing the child by following traditional trial procedures. Id. at 2803-04 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). As a result, many states have enacted statutes authorizing procedures designed
to protect the child witness from further psychological damage. Id. at 2804 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). Justice O'Connor agreed with the majority that a specific finding of necessity is
required before an exception to the defendant's right of confrontation can be established.
See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). However, "if a court makes a case-specific finding of
necessity ... the strictures of the Confrontation Clause may give way to the compelling
state interest of protecting child witnesses." Id. at 2805 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
28 Id. at 2806-07 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun argued that according to
Wigmore "'[tihere never was at common law any recognized right to an indispensable thing
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contained within the clause, an exception could be created to fur-
ther important state interests.29 Justice Blackmun, however, while
agreeing with Justice O'Connor that the protection of child sexual
abuse victims was a compelling policy consideration, 0 did not be-
lieve that the state should be required to demonstrate why the
procedure was essential in each individual case.31
The Coy majority stated that although the Court has histori-
cally recognized exceptions to the rights implicitly guaranteed a
defendant by the confrontation clause, such decisions did not sig-
nify the Court's wholesale acceptance of an exception to the right
to physically confront adverse witnesses.2 It is submitted that the
Coy Court implied that the test for finding such an exception is
identical to that which the Court has utilized in the past for find-
ing exceptions to a defendant's right of cross-examination. This
Comment will review the Coy Court's decision and compare the
circumstances under which a defendant may be denied the right to
physically confront adversary witnesses with the test used to arrive
at exceptions to the hearsay rule or the right of cross-examination.
This Comment will then examine the constitutionality of denying a
called confrontation as distinguished from cross-examination.'" Id. at 2807 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (quoting 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 1397, at 158). Justice Blackmun further
maintained that Wigmore also did not believe that a defendant's right to have witnesses
testify before him was a secondary part of the confrontation clause rights. See id. (Black-
mun, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia, on the other hand, disagreed with Wigmore's finding
that the right of confrontation only guarantees the defendant the right of cross-examination.
See id. at 2801 n.2.
19 Id. at 2808 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun stated that "'preference'
[for face-to-face confrontation] ... like all Confrontation Clause rights, "must occasionally
give way to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case .... Id. (Black-
mun, J., dissenting) (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980) (quoting Mattox v.
United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895))).
10 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun noted that the number of reported
incidents of child maltreatment increased from 670,000 to over 1.9 million from 1976 to
1985. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). He further recognized that a child who testifies in the
traditional courtroom setting may experience psychological trauma resulting in injury so
severe as to prevent the child from testifying accurately. See id. at 2809 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
31 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun argued that it was not necessary to
make specific findings regarding the necessity of protecting the particular child witness be-
cause "[a]s the many rules allowing the admission of out-of-court statements demonstrate,
legislative exceptions to the Confrontation Clause of general applicability are common-
place." Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Justice Brennan also dissented, but he did not address the confrontation clause issues.
He indicated that the defendant's conviction should be affirmed because the procedure used
was not inherently prejudicial. Id. at 2810 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
11 See id. at 2802-03.
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defendant the right to face the witnesses against him. Finally, this
Comment will examine the consequences of the Coy decision, man-
ifested in the recently decided case of Craig v. State,5 and will
demonstrate the analysis that the Craig court should have em-
ployed in light of the Coy decision.
FRAMEWORK FOR AN EXCEPTION
The rights implicit in the confrontation clause have never
been deemed absolute.3 4 The Coy Court suggested, however, that a
defendant's right to a face-to-face confrontation must be examined
under a more stringent light than implicit confrontation rights
since the defendant's right to physically confront witnesses is ex-
pressly set forth in the clause.35 Exceptions to physical confronta-
tion will be permitted only if the procedural alterations do not im-
permissibly impinge upon the defendant's right to a fair trial. 6
Additionally, the Coy Court indicated that for an exception to be
permissible, a finding must be made that it advances an important
public policy.3 7 Thus, it is suggested that the Coy opinion espouses
the view that denying a defendant the right to face an adverse wit-
ness may be constitutional if two contingencies are met: (1) the
33 76 Md. App. 250, 544 A.2d 784, cert. granted, 314 Md. 458, 550 A.2d 1168 (1988).
31 Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2802. In Coy, Justice Scalia recognized that the rights implicit in
the Confrontation Clause "may give way to other important interests." Id. Justice Scalia
also noted that the Court has characterized a defendant's right to have a face-to-face en-
counter with the witnesses against him as a "literal right to 'confront' the witness at the
time of trial." Id. at 2801 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157 (1970)).
35 See id. at 2802-03.
36 Id. at 2802. According to Justice Scalia, people generally believe that if someone dis-
agrees with them, then that person should confront them in person. See id. at 2801. The
right of confrontation promotes fairness because it is more difficult to "tell a lie about a
person 'to his face' than 'behind his back.'" Id. at 2802.
3 Id. at 2803. In Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895), the Supreme Court
considered whether at the defendant's second trial copies of the stenographer's notes of the
testimony of two adverse witnesses who had since died were admissible. See id. at 240. The
defendant claimed that to allow this would violate his sixth amendment right to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him. See id. Although admitting the transcripts would
deprive the defendant of the rights guaranteed by the confrontation clause, the Court con-
cluded that "general rules of law of this kind, however beneficent in their operation and
valuable to the accused, must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and
the necessities of the case." Id. at 243; see also Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295
(1973) (right of confrontation "not absolute and may, in appropriate cases, bow to accom-
modate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process"); Dowdell v. United States,
221 U.S. 325, 330 (1911) (sixth amendment "has always had certain well recognized excep-
tions"); Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 61 (1899) (admission of dying declarations "an
exception which arises from the necessity of the case").
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procedures are necessary to safeguard an important public policy;
and (2) they ensure a fair trial. It is further submitted that these
two tests are identical to the rationale supporting the admissibility
of certain out-of-court statements, i.e., hearsay, against a defend-
ant notwithstanding the confrontation clause.
Necessity
The Coy Court indicated that alternative procedures for child
witnesses will satisfy constitutional concerns only if the procedures
are "necessary" to further an important public policy." The con-
frontation clause also requires that before hearsay may be admit-
ted as evidence, the declarant must be unavailable as a witness.3 9
It is submitted that both the "necessity" test and the "unavailabil-
ity" test require a finding that the witness is unable to testify in
front of the defendant. The only difference is that in the case of
38 See Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2803. While the Court did not expressly say that the state's
interest in protecting child sex abuse victims was an important public policy, both the con-
curring and the dissenting opinions recognized that the state was justified in its efforts to
protect child sexual abuse victims. See id. at 2805 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 2809
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Several states have upheld the constitutionality of statutes per-
mitting the child victim to testify via closed circuit television, uniformly discussing the per-
vasiveness of child sexual abuse and the substantial state interest in protecting child wit-
nesses. See, e.g., In re R.C. Jr., 514 So. 2d 759, 764 (La. App. 1987) (allowing child's
testimony via closed circuit television due to state's compelling interest in protecting physi-
cal and psychological health of minor); State v. Warford, 223 Neb. 368, 374, 389 N.W.2d
575, 580 (1986) (state has public interest in easing emotional burden on child witnesses);
People v. Algarin, 129 Misc. 2d 1016, 1023, 498 N.Y.S.2d 977, 982 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County
1986) (state has compelling interest in protecting well-being of child sex offense victims). In
State v. Sheppard, 197 N.J. Super. 411, 484 A.2d 1330 (Law Div. 1984), the court explained
that "'[we] cannot evade [our] responsibility, as parens patriae of all minor children, to
preserve them from harm. The possibility of serious psychological harm to the child ...
transcends all other issues.'" Id. at 421, 484 A.2d at 1335 (quoting Sorentino v. Family &
Children's Soc. of Elizabeth, 72 N.J. 127, 132, 367 A.2d 1168, 1171 (1976)). It is submitted
that the protection of child witnesses warrants finding an exception to defendant's right to
face-to-face confrontation.
11 See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 62-66 (1980). In Roberts, the Court stated that the
"Sixth Amendment establishes a rule of necessity." Id. at 65. Under this rule, the prosecu-
tion must show that the declarant whose statement it wishes to use against the defendant is
"unavailable." Id. Once the prosecution has demonstrated that the witness is unavailable, it
must next prove the statement bears adequate "indicia of reliability." Id. at 66. The reliabil-
ity of the statement "can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls within
a firmly rooted hearsay exception ... [otherwise] the evidence must be excluded, at least
absent a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." Id.; see Mancusi v.
Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 213 (1972) ("even though the witness be unavailable his prior testi-
mony must bear some... 'indicia of reliability' "); see also infra notes 43-47 and accompa-
nying text (discussing "indicia of reliability" test).
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hearsay statements, the witness is unavailable in fact, while in the
context of child witnesses, the witness is not available as a matter
of policy. It is suggested that this difference does not amount to a
legal distinction, however, for the danger that the introduction of
the fiction might abrogate the defendant's confrontation right is
vitiated by the fact that the absence of the witness will not be to-
tal, as it would be in the hearsay situation, but limited to the ex-
tent demanded by the underlying policy rationale of protecting the
child.40 The defendant's right of confrontation might be further
safeguarded by requiring the trial court to specifically find that if
the child witness is forced to testify in the traditional courtroom
setting, there is a substantial likelihood that the child will suffer
severe psychological injury.41
40 Some states that have upheld statutes allowing the child witness to testify without
having to face the defendant have done so in part because the defendant's other confronta-
tion rights were preserved. See Commonwealth v. Willis, 716 S.W.2d 224, 227 (Ky. 1986)
(testimony via closed circuit television not unconstitutional where right of cross-examina-
tion not duly inhibited and jury able to evaluate demeanor and credibility of witness); Com-
monwealth v. Lohman, 370 Pa. Super. 404, 409, 536 A.2d 809, 811 (1988) (no constitutional
invalidation if right of cross-examination preserved and witness observed).
11 See Graham, The Confrontation Clause, the Hearsay Rule, and Child Sexual Abuse
Prosecutions: The State of the Relationship, 72 MINN. L. REv. 523, 559-560 (1988) ("un-
availability" under confrontation clause requires establishing likelihood of severe psycholog-
ical injury); Graham, Indicia of Reliability and Face to Face Confrontation: Emerging Is-
sues in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 40 U. MIAMI L. REv. 19, 83 (1985)
("unavailability" requires that court find that emotional trauma likely to be suffered by
child victim is "significantly more severe than the emotional distress or trauma often suf-
fered by other witnesses"); see also Hochheiser v. Superior Court, 161 Cal. App. 3d 777, 793,
208 Cal. Rptr. 273, 283 (1984) (basis for decision that child can testify without facing de-
fendant must specify "nature, degree and potential duration" of injury).
Several commentators have examined the effect on a child sexual abuse victim of testi-
fying in open court before the defendant. Testifying at trial may create fear or stress, and
cause withdrawal, anxiety, enuresis, guilt, antisocial behavior, and lack of self-esteem. See
Parker, The Rights of Child Witnesses: Is the Court a Protector or Perpetrator?, 17 NEw
ENG. L. REV. 643, 649-53 (1982) (proposing legislation to reduce trauma and protect victim
without violating defendant's constitutional rights). See generally Goodman, The Child
Witness: Conclusions and Future Directions for Research and Legal Practice, reprinted in
NATIONAL LEGAL RES. CENTER FOR CHILD ADvoc. & PROTECTION, PAPERS FROM A NATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON LEGAL REFORMS IN CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASES 61 (1985) (suggesting need
for additional research on emotional trauma likely to be suffered by child witnesses). Facing
the accused again is one component of the trial proceedings having a damaging psychologi-
cal effect on the child. See Libai, The Protection of the Child Victim of a Sexual Offense in
the Criminal Justice System, 15 WAYNE L. REv. 977, 984 (1969). Other aspects of the crimi-
nal justice system likely to traumatize the child victim include "cross-examination; ... offi-
cial atmosphere in court; [and] the acquittal of the accused for want of corroborating evi-
dence to the child's trustworthy testimony." Id. See generally J. SILKEN & P. SCHOUTEN,
THE CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASE IN THE COURTROOM: A SOURCE BOOK (1987) (discussing cur-
rent issues involving child sexual abuse victims, including medical and psychological issues).
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Ensuring a Fair Trial
The Coy Court recognized that guaranteeing the defendant
the right to confront the witnesses against him promotes a criminal
justice system "'in which the perception as well as the reality of
fairness prevails.' -142 Likewise, the confrontation clause permits
the admission of out-of-court statements only if the prosecution
demonstrates that the statement bears sufficient "indicia of relia-
bility" to ensure its accuracy.43 If the witness has previously testi-
fied under oath44 so that a factfinder has been able to judge the
witness' demeanor,45 and if the defendant has had the opportunity
for cross-examination, 46 then the out-of-court statement will gener-
ally be deemed reliable.47 Similarly, it is asserted that under a con-
It has also been suggested that requiring physical confrontation with the defendant pro-
duces unreliable evidence since it may impair the child's ability to remember. See Note,
Videotaping Children's Testimony: An Empirical View, 85 MIcH. L. REv. 809, 819-21
(1987).
42 Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2802 (quoting Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 540 (1986)). The Court
in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), held that the defendant's sixth amendment right to
confront the witnesses against him was a fundamental right made applicable to the states by
the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 403. The fact that the right of confrontation was included
in the Bill of Rights "reflects the belief of the Framers of those liberties and safeguards that
confrontation was a fundamental right essential to a fair trial in a criminal prosecution."
Pointer, 380 U.S. at 404; cf. Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963) (sixth amend-
ment right to counsel "fundamental and essential to a fair trial").
" See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65-66; Mancusi, 408 U.S. at 213; see also Dutton v. Evans,
400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970) (adequacy of indicia of reliability determines whether "statement
may be placed before the jury though there is no confrontation of the declarant"). See gen-
erally supra note 39 (discussing two-pronged "unavailability"/"indicia of reliability" test).
44 See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970). The confrontation clause ensures
that the witness will give his statements under oath, which serves to foster truthfulness by
impressing upon the witness the seriousness of the matter. Id.
41 See id. Allowing the jury to observe the witness' demeanor aids the jury in evaluating
his or her credibility. Id.; see also Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968) (right of confron-
tation includes giving jury opportunity to assess witness' demeanor).
" See Pointer, 380 U.S. at 404 ("no one ... would deny the value of cross-examination
in exposing falsehood and bringing out the truth in the trial of a criminal case"); see also
Kentucky v. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. 2658, 2662 (1987) (cross-examination "critical for ensuring
the integrity of the fact finding process"); Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 22 (1985) (per
curiam) (cross-examination calls "to the attention of the fact finder the reasons for giving
scant weight to the witness' testimony").
'7 See Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 213 (1972). In determining whether the prior
testimony of an unavailable witness was admissible against the defendant, the Mancusi
Court reasoned:
Since there was an adequate opportunity to cross-examine [the witness] at
the first trial, and counsel for [the defendant] availed himself of that opportunity,
the transcript of [the witness'] testimony in the first trial bore sufficient "indicia
of reliability" and afforded "the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the
truth of the prior statement . .. ."
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frontation exception, the reliability of a child's testimony will be
assured only if the child witness is required to testify under oath in
the presence of the jury, and the defendant is ultimately given the
opportunity to cross-examine.
Additional Safeguards
In Coy, Justice Scalia was concerned that a defendant's right
to a fair trial would be impaired if a child witness testified outside
of the defendant's presence because in that situation it is less
likely that the child will feel compelled to speak the truth." Thus,
an exception to the right of confrontation should be permitted only
if the court informs the child witness that the defendant is able to
see and hear the child during the child's testimony.49 Advising the
child of the defendant's presence, it is submitted, addresses Justice
Scalia's concern without jeopardizing the state's interest in pro-
tecting the child from psychological damage.
A final suggested protection has its origins in the defendant's
right to receive a fair trial? ° A criminal defendant's due process
rights are violated if the procedure adopted is likely to be inher-
ently prejudicial.5 1 Although a procedure designed to allow the
child witness to testify without facing the defendant may not nec-
Id. at 216 (quoting Dutton, 400 U.S. at 89). The Supreme Court has expressly stated that "a
witness under oath, subject to cross-examination, and whose demeanor can be observed by
the trier of fact, is a reliable informant." Dutton, 400 U.S. at 88; see also Green, 399 U.S. at
165 (where at preliminary hearing witness was under oath and subject to cross-examination,
and defendant represented by counsel, testimony admissible at trial despite fact that de-
fendant did not have opportunity for face-to-face confrontation).
Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2802; see supra note 21.
4' See Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2806 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The Iowa statute in Coy
required that the court advise the child of the defendant's ability to see and hear his or her
testimony; the defendant did not assert that the court had not complied with this provision.
Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
50 See In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955); see also Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S.
375, 385-86 (1966) (defendant deprived of due process right to fair trial if incompetent to
stand trial). In Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961), Justice Frankfurter declared: "One of the
rightful boasts of Western civilization is that the State has the burden of establishing guilt
solely on the basis of evidence produced in court and under circumstances assuring an
accused all the safeguards of a fair procedure." Id. at 729 (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(emphasis added).
11 See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1965) (state procedure may involve "such a
probability that prejudice will result that it is deemed inherently lacking in due process").
Furthermore, a criminal defendant is entitled to a presumption of innocence. Coffin v.
United States, 156 U.S. 432, 459 (1895). If the procedures used infringe upon this presump-
tion they will be deemed inherently prejudicial. See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503-05
(1976).
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essarily cause the jury to prejudge the defendant's guilt or inno-
cence,52 the potential for unfairness 53 dictates the conclusion that
the judge should instruct the jury to refrain from drawing any in-
ferences from the procedure employed in the courtroom."
RAMIFICATIONS OF Coy
The Coy Court's cryptic reasoning has generated confusion
among lower courts faced with challenges to the constitutionality
of statutes permitting child witnesses to testify without facing the
defendant. The recent decision by the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland in Craig v. State55 exemplifies a court's attempt to for-
mulate a coherent exception consistent with the Coy decision.
The defendant in Craig owned and operated a kindergarten
and pre-kindergarten school, 56 which the victim attended for two
years beginning at age four.57 The child testified that on several
occasions the defendant had sexually abused her .5  Following a
52 See Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2810 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun concluded
that the use of the screen at trial was not inherently prejudicial because it did not indicate
that the defendant was guilty. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
53 See Tuney v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927). In Tumey, the Court explained:
[T]he requirement of due process of law in judicial procedure is not satisfied by
the argument that men of the highest honor and the greatest self-sacrifice could
carry it on without danger of injustice. Every procedure which would offer a possi-
ble temptation to the average man as a judge to forget the burden of proof re-
quired to convict the defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the balance
nice, clear and true between the State and the accused, denies the latter due pro-
cess of law.
Id. at 532. The importance of fairness was highlighted in In re Murchison, when the Court
stated that "[flairness of course requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases. But
our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness." 349
U.S. at 136.
54 See Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2810 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan indicated that
the instruction given by the trial court made it unlikely that the jury drew improper infer-
ences from the use of the screen. See id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). The trial court in Coy
instructed the jury, inter alia:
[Y]ou are to draw no inference of any kind from the presence of that screen. You
know, in the plainest of language, that is not evidence of the defendant's guilt,
and it shouldn't be in your mind as an inference as to any guilt on his part. It's
very important that you do that intellectual thing.
Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
55 76 Md. App. 250, 544 A.2d 784, cert. granted, 314 Md. 458, 550 A.2d 1168 (1988).
Is Id. at 254, 544 A.2d at 786.
'1 See id.
59 See id. The child testified that the defendant had kicked her on the legs and in her
"private parts," and that she had stuck her with thumbtacks. Id. at 264, 544 A.2d at 791.
She also stated that the defendant had touched her with a stick "in her private parts." Id.
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jury trial, the defendant was convicted of committing various sex-
ual offenses against the child.59 At trial, the court permitted the
child witness to testify via closed circuit television pursuant to the
procedures authorized by Maryland statute.60 On appeal, the Court
of Special Appeals of Maryland rejected the defendant's conten-
tion that the procedure violated his sixth amendment right to con-
front the witnesses against him. 1
The Craig court recognized that the procedure used by the
trial court did not satisfy the defendant's right to face-to-face con-
frontation.2 However, Craig interpreted the Coy decision as
merely striking down the procedures adopted by the Iowa legisla-
ture as they applied to the facts in that case. 3 Coy was further
understood as reserving for the future a decision as to whether an
exception to a defendant's right of confrontation would be consti-
tutional. 4 Consequently, the Craig court found Coy inapplicable,65
relying instead on the decision of the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land in Wildermuth v. State.6 Wildermuth had held that the pro-
cedure instituted pursuant to the Maryland statute was constitu-
tional because it satisfied the Ohio v. Roberts test of
"unavailability" and "indicia of reliability. ' 67 Thus, the Craig
11 See id. at 257, 544 A.2d at 787.
60 See id. The Maryland Code provides in pertinent part:
(a) (1) In a case of abuse of a child.., a court may order that the testimony
of a child victim be taken outside the courtroom and shown in the courtroom by
means of closed circuit television if:
(i) The testimony is taken during the proceeding; and
(ii) The judge determines that the testimony by the child victim in the
courtroom will result in the child suffering serious emotional distress such
that the child cannot reasonably communicate.
MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-102 (Supp. 1988).
61 See Craig, 76 Md. App. at 284, 544 A.2d at 800.
62 Id. at 281, 544 A.2d at 799. The child witnesses testified in the judge's chambers
where they were unable to see or hear the defendant but the defendant could see and hear
them. Id.
63 Id. at 282, 544 A.2d at 799.
Id. The Craig court drew the following three conclusions from the Coy decision: 1)
the question of whether the defendant had an absolute right to confront the adverse wit-
nesses was left open; 2) the state's interest in protecting child witnesses may justify an ex-
ception; and 3) if, in fact, Justice Scalia considered a specific finding of necessity to be
required, only four Justices agreed with this view. Id. at 280, 544 A.2d at 798-99.
65 Id. at 281, 544 A.2d at 799.
66 310 Md. 496, 530 A.2d 275 (1987).
6" See Craig, 76 Md. App. at 283, 544 A.2d at 800. The Wildermuth court applied the
Ohio v. Roberts test as the basis for an exception to the defendant's right to a face-to-face
confrontation: "[I]f there is sufficient necessity for not permitting the accused to confront
his accuser directly (unavailability), and if the situation is such that there is some reasona-
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court determined an exception could be made where the child wit-
ness would be unable to reasonably communicate if compelled to
testify face-to-face with the defendant and the state ensured that
the defendant's other confrontation clause rights were preserved. 8
It is submitted that by relying on the Wildermuth decision, the
Craig court correctly applied the guidelines suggested by the Su-
preme Court in Coy for finding an exception. However, it is also
submitted that in doing so the Craig court neglected to give suffi-
cient consideration to the right that Justice Scalia believed had to
be fiercely protected-the defendant's right to a fair trial. The trial
court in Craig neither advised the child that the defendant was
able to see and hear her testify,"9 nor, apparently, did it inform the
jury that no inference of guilt should be drawn by reason of the
procedure implemented.7 0 Hence, it is submitted that the Craig
court failed to fully safeguard the defendant's constitutional right
to a fair trial.
CONCLUSION
The Coy Court confirmed the prevailing view that the con-
frontation clause guarantees the defendant the right to physically
confront adversary witnesses, but declined to decide whether or
not this right was absolute. This Comment has suggested that pre-
cisely the same factors considered in determining the constitution-
ality of admitting certain hearsay statements should be considered
in determining the constitutionality of child witness protection
statutes. The Coy Court, by failing to recognize the similarities be-
tween the two determinations, has left the state of the law unnec-
ble substitute for the truth-seeking confrontation requirement of physical presence (reliabil-
ity), then the right of confrontation may still be satisfied." Wildermuth, 310 Md. at 515, 530
A.2d at 284 (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 73-77 (1980)). The Wildermuth court ex-
plained that the "reliability" test is met if the defendant has the opportunity to cross-ex-
amine the witness, the testimony is given under oath, and the judge and jury are able to
observe the witness during the testimony. Id., 530 A.2d at 285. The court determined that
the statute ensures that the unavailability test will be met because in order for the child to
testify without viewing the defendant "the judge must determine 'that testimony by the
child victim in the courtroom will result in the child suffering serious emotional distress
such that the child cannot reasonably communicate.'" Id. at 519, 530 A.2d at 286 (quoting
MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-102(a)(1)(ii) (Supp. 1988)).
61 See Craig, 76 Md. App. at 280-82, 544 A.2d at 799.
61 See Craig, 76 Md. App. at 288, 544 A.2d at 802-03. The Maryland statute does not
require that the judge inform the child of the defendant's ability to perceive him or her. MD.
CTS. & JUD. PRoc. CODE ANN. § 9-102 (Supp. 1988).
7' See Craig, 76 Md. App. at 255-56, 544 A.2d at 786-87.
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essarily uncertain.71 It is suggested that the Supreme Court allevi-
ate this uncertainty by sustaining at the first opportunity an
exception to the defendant's right to physically confront witnesses
against him when such an exception would promote the state's
compelling interest in protecting child witnesses without substan-
tially infringing upon the defendant's constitutional rights.
Alisa Odeen
1 Compare Craig v. State, 76 Md. App. 250, 284-89, 544 A.2d 784, 800-03, cert.
granted, 314 Md. 458, 550 A.2d 1168 (1988) (permitting child to testify via closed circuit
television did not violate of defendant's confrontation clause rights under Coy) with Gibson
v. State, 533 So. 2d 338, 339 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (allowing child victim to testify
behind one-way mirror violated defendant's confrontation clause rights).
In another recently decided case, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania decided that Coy
did not prevent a seven-year-old victim of sexual abuse from being told prior to cross-exam-
ination that she did not have to look at the defendant while testifying. See Commonwealth
v. Groff, 548 A.2d 1237, 1244 (Pa. Super. 1988).
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